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RECENT DECISIONS
should exclude economic losses under Section 402 (A) and relegate them
solely to an assumpsit action based on the Commercial Code. It should
have logically eliminated contributory negligence as a defense since the
action is not predicated upon negligence. The court should have more fully
explained its rationale underlying the adoption of such a significant
change of law. Now the doctrine's explanation, extension or limitations
must await clarification thereby continuing the confusion until such time
as the appropriate fact situations are presented to the court. Such a
categorical change in the Pennsylvania law, albeit a desirable change,
demands a more complete elucidation.
I. Jerome Mansmann
TRADE REGULATIONS-"Monopolizing" under Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act-An inquiry into an alleged violator's willfulness is neces-
sitated.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
While a monopolist1 must continue to flex his economic muscles with
extreme caution and enlightened awareness of the antitrust laws, the
Grinnell2 decision, at least, permits him to maintain a legal existence.
Since the Alcoa' doctrine was announced in 1945, the sustenance of mo-
nopoly power4 has been singularly vulnerable to an indictment under
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' Fashioning a virtual per se
principle for a "monopolizing" offense, Alcoa allowed for a monopolist
only when that powerful position is "thrust upon him,"6 and sounded the
dirge for the honestly industrial monopolizer. Authored by Mr. Justice
1. A monopolist is defined in terms of monopoly power, i.e., to control prices, United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), or exclude competition, Patterson v. United
States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915) or regulate produc-
tion. See also United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Such
monopoly power has generally been inferred from a predominant percentage-share of the
relevant market: 80% in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1911), and
90% in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
1955 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L. COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 43-44, 48-55.
2. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. See note 1, supra, for meaning of "monopoly power."
5. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1940), "Every person who shall monopolize . . .
any part of the trade or commerce .... "
6. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945),
Judge Learned Hand illustrated this "thrusting" with only three situations: "A market . . .so
limited that it is impossible to produce . . . except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand . . . [cihanges in taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A
single producer may be the survivor . . .by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and in-
dustry."
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Douglas, the majority7 opinion in Grinnell, at once, settle this dichoto-
mously disputed' proscription of Sherman section 2 and dispelled the
paradoxical' notion of the Alcoa pronouncement.
Grinnell Corporation (Grinnell) through its wholly-owned or solely-
controlled subsidiaries American District Telegraph Co. (ADT), Holmes
Electric Protective Co. (Holmes), and Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of
Delaware (AFA), engaged in providing central station protective ser-
vices' ° (CSPS). The district court's delineation of the relevant market"
-accredited companies" in the CSPS business operating nationally-
revealed that the Grinnell congeries controlled over 87% of that market.
Inferentially, this predomination satisfies the initial requisite to the out-
lawed "monopolizing"-monopoly power.' 3
Grinnell's ill-fated attainment of this position originated in 1906 and
1907 when contracts among and between the defendant corporations pre-
empted for each, a geographical segment of the nation. These restrictive
agreements also limited each to offering only designated services in their
delimited segment. 4 Indisputably violative per se of Sherman section 1,1"
7. Three justices dissented (Harlan, J., Fortas, J., and Stewart, J.); however, all took
issue solely with the majority's affirmation of the district court's delineation of the relevant
market and urged a reversal so that it might be redetermined.
8. One school advances the argument that mere monopoly position was proscribed.
Absent the enumerated circumstances, this was the option of Alcoa. Contrariwise, the other
interpretation would prohibit only the monopolist enlisting positive drive to attain or
maintain his predominance. This is the apparent subscription of Grinnell. See Adler,
Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two .o the Sherman Act, 31 HARv. L.
REv. 246 (1917), and 21 CONG. REc. 2456-2460 (1890).
.9. The ostensible purpose of the antitrust laws of the United States is to foster com-
petition; competition which pits one firm against another in a free market. Having pro-
moted this aggressive atmosphere, the antitrust laws later denounce the burgeoning victor
as a "monopolizer" and denude him of his powers. Irreconcilably, the very impetus to attain
such power originated in the competitive spirit initially encouraged.
10. The various services offered include the following:
(1) automatic burglar alarms
(2) automatic fire alarms
(3) sprinkler supervisory systems
(4) night watchman signal services
Each functions electronically from a central station which is manned twenty-four hours a
day.
11. This is a prerequisite to establishing monopoly power therein. See United States v.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
12. CSPS companies are accredited by insurance underwriters.
13. See note 1, supra, for examples of other inferences.
14. Under one contract, for example, ADT transferred its burglar alarm systems to
Holmes which was to operate only in the Middle Atlantic States, and agreed to refrain
forever from competing therein. Reciprocally, Holmes transferred to ADT its night watch-
man signal service and similarly agreed not to compete in that business.
15. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); 1955 Ai-r'Y.
GsN. NAT'L Com. ANTITRUST REP. 26.
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these conspiracies exemplified the defendant's embryonic efforts to gain
monopoly proportions. At the institution of the Government's suit (1964),
Grinnell held 76% of the stock of ADT, 89% of the stock of AFA, and
100% of the stock of Holmes. Each was effected by outright stock or
asset acquisitions. In addition, ADT and Holmes, over the years, pur-
chased and either dismantled or assimilated thirty competitors. Seven
of these purchases involved lifetime no-competition pacts. Even at the
commencement of the instant suit, each of the defendants (except
Grinnell) had an offer outstanding to purchase each of the four largest
non-defendant competitors. Such artificial augmentation, designed clearly
to obviate competition, occasioned another illustration of the defendant's
willfulness which was later to be denounced by the Supreme Court. Fur-
ther, Grinnell indulged in discriminatory pricing practices which, ad-
mittedly, deterred potential competitors from inaugurating a CSPS. ADT,
in fact, threatened retaliation against each firm which even contemplated
a competing central service. Assuredly, the defendant's now-unlawful will
was amply manifested.
In the district court,'6 Judge Wyzanski"7 applied the rebuttable pre-
sumption phenomenon to this case. He decided that, ". . . once the
Government has borne the burden of proving what is the relevant market
and how predominant a share of that market defendant has, it follows
that there are rebuttable presumptions that defendant has monopoly
power and has monopolized in violation of § 2."' 18 This conception re-
affirms, indeed extends, Alcoa. Under Judge Wyzanski's proclamation, a
simple showing of Grinnell's predominance in the relevant market pro-
vided a presumptive infringement of Sherman section 2. To exculpate
themselves, the defendants would then have to come forward with proof
of a cause as permitted by Alcoa.
Although pretending it unnecessary to dispose of the district court's
novel proposition,' 9 Justice Douglas effectively renders it a nullity, as he
held, both "the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market...
and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power"2 as essential
elements of a "monopolizing" violation. By promulgating "willful acquisi-
tion or maintenance" of monopoly power as the "second ingredient" of a
"monopolizing" contravention of Sherman section 2, the opinion neces-
16. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964).
17. Judge Wyzanski is well acquainted with the antitrust field, particularly Section 2
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and has rendered erudite contributive decisions in recent
years. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1953) ; Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 833 (1960).
18. 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964).
19. 384 U.S. 563, n.7 (1966).
20. Id. at 570.
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sarily decides whether the defendant must demonstrate his honestly in-
dustrial methods or the Government must prove the putative mono-
polizer's willfully predatory connivances.
In favoring the latter approach, the Supreme Court emasculates the
district court's pronouncement and recedes drastically from the virtual
per se position advanced in Alcoa. Mere monopoly power becomes neither
presumptive nor essentially conclusive evidence of a Sherman section 2
violation. More importantly, Grinnell revitalizes the "rule of reason" as
conceived in 1911 by Mr. Justice White and particularized in 1918 by Mr.
Justice Brandeis. 1 With reference to "monopolizing," this concept envi-
sions an exploration of the reasonableness of the monopolist's methods. In
essence, a demonstration of willful, predatory tactics becomes an in-
dispensible ingredient to branding the defendant monopolist as unreason-
able and, consequently, offensive to the antitrust laws. Although Grinnell
and its affiliates lost the instant case, the necessitated inquiry into the
manners of the monopolist resuscitates, legally, the monopolist with
integrity, and alleviates the paradoxical Alcoa doctrine by heralding will-
ful, positive drive as the touchstone of a Sherman section 2, "monopoliz-
ing" transgression.
H. Kennedy Linge
TRADE REGULAIONs-Group Boycott-Restraint of Trade-A joint
refusal to deal resulting in an exclusion of traders from the competitive
market is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
In a civil action brought by the United States Government, defendants,
General Motors Corporation and three Chevrolet dealer associations, were
held to have violated the prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
21. In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Mr. Justice
White conceptualized the "rule of reason." Briefly this concept demands an inquiry into
the purpose, power and effect and requires a definite factual showing of illegality of a de-
fendant's conduct. An eminent enumeration of the considerations involved was advanced
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In that case, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, at 238, dissected and analyzed, ". .. the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
he attained, are all relevant facts." In many areas of antitrust law, the "rule of reason"
has been discarded in favor of per se or virtual per se principles; this decision may fore-
shadow its revival.
1. The statute reads in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
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